Seguraça extrema com LIDS
Este artigo nos introduz ao LIDS (Linux Intrusion Detection System), um sistema robusto que aplicado como patch no kernel nos oferece recursos extremos de configurações de segurança do sistema operacional.
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Por: Anderson L Tamborim em 21/02/2004 | Blog: http://y2h4ck.wordpress.com
lidsadm version 0.4.1 for LIDS project
Huagang Xie <xie@gnuchina.org>
Philippe Biondi <pbi@cartel-info.fr>
Usage: lidsadm -[S|I] -- [+|-][LIDS_FLAG] [...]
lidsadm -V
lidsadm -h
Commands:
-S To submit a password to switch some protections
-I To switch some protections without submitting
password (sealing time)
-V To view current LIDS state (caps/flags)
-v To show the version
-h To list this help
Available capabilities:
CAP_CHOWN chown(2)/chgrp(2)
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE DAC access
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH DAC read
CAP_FOWNER owner ID not equal user ID
CAP_FSETID effective user ID not equal owner ID
CAP_KILL real/effective ID not equal process ID
CAP_SETGID set*gid(2)
CAP_SETUID set*uid(2)
CAP_SETPCAP transfer capability
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE immutable and append file attributes
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE binding to ports below 1024
CAP_NET_BROADCAST broadcasting/listening to multicast
CAP_NET_ADMIN interface/firewall/routing changes
CAP_NET_RAW raw sockets
CAP_IPC_LOCK locking of shared memory segments
CAP_IPC_OWNER IPC ownership checks
CAP_SYS_MODULE insertion and removal of kernel modules
CAP_SYS_RAWIO ioperm(2)/iopl(2) access
CAP_SYS_CHROOT chroot(2)
CAP_SYS_PTRACE ptrace(2)
CAP_SYS_PACCT configuration of process accounting
CAP_SYS_ADMIN tons of admin stuff
CAP_SYS_BOOT reboot(2)
CAP_SYS_NICE nice(2)
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE setting resource limits
CAP_SYS_TIME setting system time
CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG tty configuration
CAP_MKNOD mknod operation
CAP_LEASE taking leases on files
CAP_HIDDEN hidden process
CAP_KILL_PROTECTED kill protected programs
CAP_PROTECTED Protect the process from signals
Available flags:
LIDS de-/activate LIDS locally (the shell & childs)
LIDS_GLOBAL de-/activate LIDS entirely
RELOAD_CONF reload config. file and inode/dev of
protected programs
lidsconf version 0.4.1 for the LIDS project
Huagang Xie <xie@gnuchina.org>
Philippe Biondi <philippe.biondi@webmotion.net>
Usage: lidsconf -A [-s subject] -o object [-d] [-t from-to]
[-i level] -j ACTION
lidsconf -D [-s file] [-o file]
lidsconf -Z
lidsconf -U
lidsconf -L [-e]
lidsconf -P
lidsconf -v
lidsconf -[h|H]
Commands:
-A,--add To add an entry
-D,--delete To delete an entry
-Z,--zero To delete all entries
-U,--update To update dev/inode numbers
-L,--list To list all entries
-P,--passwd To encrypt a password with RipeMD-160
-v,--version To show the version
-h,--help To list this help
-H,--morehelp To list this help with CAP/SOCKET name
subject: -s,--subject subj
can be any program, must be a file
object: -o,--object [obj]
can be a file, directory or Capability, Socket Name
ACTION: -j,--jump
DENY deny access
READONLY read only
APPEND append only
WRITE writable
GRANT grant capability to subject
IGNORE ignore any permissions set on this object
DISABLE disable some extersion feature
OPTION:
-d,--domain The object is an EXEC Domain
-i,--inheritance Inheritance level
-t,--time Time dependency
-e,--extended Extended list
[*] Allow switching LIDS protections
(3) Number of attempts to submit password
(30) Time to wait after a fail (seconds)
[ ] Allow remote users to switch LIDS protections
[ ] Allow any program to switch LIDS protections
[*] Allow reloading config. file <-----------
VIEW
CAP_CHOWN 0
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 0
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 0
CAP_FOWNER 0
CAP_FSETID 0
CAP_KILL 0
CAP_SETGID 0
CAP_SETUID 0
CAP_SETPCAP 0
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 0
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 0
CAP_NET_BROADCAST 0
CAP_NET_ADMIN 0
CAP_NET_RAW 0
CAP_IPC_LOCK 0
CAP_IPC_OWNER 0
CAP_SYS_MODULE 0
CAP_SYS_RAWIO 0
CAP_SYS_CHROOT 0
CAP_SYS_PTRACE 0
CAP_SYS_PACCT 0
CAP_SYS_ADMIN 0
CAP_SYS_BOOT 1
CAP_SYS_NICE 0
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 1
CAP_SYS_TIME 0
CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 0
CAP_MKNOD 0
CAP_LEASE 0
CAP_HIDDEN 1
CAP_KILL_PROTECTED 0
CAP_PROTECTED 0
LIDS 0
LIDS_GLOBAL 1
RELOAD_CONF 0
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